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Introduction Motivation
Motivation
Market power concerns in electricity markets have led regulators to
impose forward contract obligations:
Producers receive a xed price for a certain fraction of their output
prior to wholesale market competition.
Examples:
Vesting contractsin the UK.
Stranded costs recovery mechanisms (Spain and California).
Virtual Power Plantsin several EU counties.
[Several other vertical commitments, including vertical integration]
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Introduction Motivation
Main issues
1 How do such contracts a¤ect equilibrium bidding behaviour?
2 Do they contribute to reducing prices and increasing welfare?
3 How should contracts be awarded for them to be pro-competitive?
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Introduction Literature
Related literature
Literature on (endogenous) forward contracts:
Allaz and Vila (JET 1993): Cournot; pro-competitive
Mahenc and Salanié (JET 2004): Bertrand; anticompetitive
Despite rms being net-sellers, we nd anti-competitive e¤ects
because of asymmetries among rms
Auctions literature:
Wilson (QJE 1979): share auctions; collusive-like equilibria
Kremer and Nyborg (RFS 2004): discreteness destroys under-pricing
Despite discreteness, we recover under-pricing
because we relax the at common value assumption
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Introduction Overview
Overview and main ndings
Multi-unit uniform-price auction model with complete information:
Supply functions with a nite number of steps
Firms own a portfolio of technologies (increasing marginal costs)
Exogenous forward contracts (nancially settled)
Equilibrium bidding:
All rms but one behave as price-takers [non-price-setters, NPS ]
Remaining rm sets price to max. prots over residual demand
[price-setter, PS ]
Potentially as many candidate equilibria as rms in the market
...but a non-price-setter might deviate to a higher price
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Introduction Overview
Overview and main ndings (cont.)
Impact of forward contracts:
A contracted PS sets lower prices (prices only a¤ect uncovered sales)
...but this enhances the NPSincentives to set higher prices
...so equilibria with contracted rm setting the price might disappear
If remaining equilibria have lower prices: pro-competitive e¤ects
When? contracts allocated to large rms
If remaining equilibria have higher prices: anti-competitive e¤ects
When? contracts allocated to medium-sized rms
Conclusion:
Award contracts so as to (virtually) reduce rmsasymmetries
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Overview and main 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Figure 1: Forward contracts by large rm
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Model Description Ingredients
Model Ingredients
N rms (possibly asymmetric)
Perfectly divisible good; demand D(p), with D 0(p)  0
Each rm has multiple-units (nite number)
Each unit has constant marginal costs up to its capacity
Possibly asymmetric within/across rms
Marginal cost functions are non-decreasing step functions
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Model Description Market rules
Bidding
Firms submit a nite number of price-quantity pairs
Bid functions: non-decreasing left continuous step functions
bi = f(pis , qis )gs¯s=1 with pis+1  pis and qis+1  qis
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Figure 3: Example with marginal costs ci = f(0, 1), (1, 2), ...g (red) and bid
function bi = f(0, 0.5), (1, 1), ...g (blue)
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Model Description Market rules
Dispatch and pricing
Dispatch:
Auctioneer calls units to produce in increasing price order
The stop-out price, p, is equal to the price of the last accepted bid
All quantities o¤ered at prices below p produce at capacity
E¢ cient tie-breaking rule for units biding at p
Pricing:
All dispatched output receives p (uniform-price auction)
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Model Description Forward Contracts
Forward Contracts
(Exogenous) forward contracts, for rm i :
contract quantity xi  0; contract price τi
Ass. xi < qci (competitive output)- relaxed in the paper
Physical contracts:
pii (p) = τixi + p [qi   xi ]  Ci (qi )
...or Financial contracts (contracts for di¤erences):
pii (p) = pqi   Ci (qi ) + [τi   p] xi
Firm is chooses a bid function that max. pii given rivalsbids
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Illustrative Example Description
Illustrative example
N = 2 rms
Each rm owns 3 production units with ci = f0, 1, 2g
For simplicity, ass. rm i submits one price per unit,
bi = fpi1, pi2, pi3g
S is aggregate supply (bids ranked in ascending price order)
Inelastic demand, D = 3, and price-cap pR = 3
Wlog, we omit contract revenues, τi = 0
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Illustrative Example Symmetric rms without contracts
Competitive outcome
Suppose both rms bid at MC, bi = f0, 1, 2g , i = 1, 2
Aggregate supply is S = f0, 0, 1, 1, 2, 2g
So that pc = 1, qci = 3/2 and pi
c
i = [1  0] + 1/2  [1  1] = 1
The competitive outcome cannot be sustained in equilibrium:
Given b2 = f0, 1, 2g , rm 1 deviates to b01 = f2, 2, 2g
Aggregate supply becomes S 0 = f0, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2g
p = 2 and q1 = 1
pi1 = 2 > pic1 = 1, i.e., the deviation is protable!
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Illustrative Example Symmetric rms without contracts
Equilibrium bidding w/o contracts
Is b1 = f2, 2, 2g and b2 = f0, 1, 2g an equilibrium? [recall D = 3]
Given b2 = f0, 1, 2g , rm 1 is setting its prot-max. price, p = 2:
pi1 (p) =
8<:
0 if p > 2
p if 1  p  2
p + [p   1] if 0  p  1
Given b1 = f2, 2, 2g , rm 2 cannot protably change the price:
If p > 2, rm 2 would sell nothing
If p < 2, rm 2 would have to bid below MC
Given p = 2, rm 2 cannot protably change its output (as a
price-taker, its producing all it can w/o incurring in losses)
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Given b1 = f2, 2, 2g , rm 2 cannot protably change the price:
If p > 2, rm 2 would sell nothing
If p < 2, rm 2 would have to bid below MC
Given p = 2, rm 2 cannot protably change its output (as a
price-taker, its producing all it can w/o incurring in losses)
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Illustrative Example Symmetric rms without contracts
Equilibrium bidding w/o contracts
1. Hence, b1 = f2, 2, 2g and b2 = f0, 1, 2g is an equilibrium
Firm 1 sets the price at p = 2 while rm 2 is a price-taker
2. By symmetry, b2 = f2, 2, 2g and b1 = f0, 1, 2g is also an equilibrium
Firm 2 sets the price at p = 2 while rm 1 is a price-taker
Many other equilibria, e.g. bi = f2, 2, 3g and bj = f1, 1, 2g
...but they are all price-equivalent!
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Illustrative Example Symmetric rms with contracts
Equilibrium bidding with contracts
Suppose x1 2 (1, 2) and x2 = 0
[No-contracts: two equilibria with rm i = 1, 2 setting the price at p = 2]
The equilibrium in which rm 1 sets the price disappears:
If rm 2 bids at MC, rm 1 responds by also bidding at MC
Bidding above MC is now unprotable since q1  1 < x1 (net-buyer)
...but rm 2 then responds by setting p2 = 2
Given p = 2, rm 1 does not deviate since q1 = 2 > x1 (net-seller)
Hence, the equilibrium in which rm 2 sets the price still exists
Contracts eliminate one equilibrium
but the equilibrium price remains the same
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Illustrative Example Asymmetric rms without contracts
Asymmetric rms
Assume now that rms are asymmetric:
Firm 1 has 4 units, with c1 = f0, 1, 2, 2g [large rm]
Firm 2s has 2 units, with c2 = f0, 1g [small rm]
No-contracts case: multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes
1 Firm 2 bids at MC; rm 1 sets p = P = 3 [high-price equilibrium]
2 Firm 1 bids at MC; rm 2 sets p = 2 [low-price equilibrium]
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Illustrative Example Asymmetric rms with contracts
Contracts for the large rm
Suppose x1 2 (1, 2) and x2 = 0
The high-price equilibrium disappears:
If rm 2 bids at MC, rm 1 responds by also bidding at MC
...but if rm 1 bids at MC, rm 2 responds by setting p = 2
The low-price equilibrium still exists
Forward contracts are pro-competitive
They (weakly) decrease prices
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Illustrative Example Asymmetric rms with contracts
Contracts for the small rm
Suppose x1 = 0 and x2 2 (1, 2)
The low-price equilibrium disappears:
If rm 1 bids at MC, rm 2 responds by also bidding at MC
...but if rm 2 bids at MC, rm 1 responds by setting p = 3
The high-price equilibrium still exists
Forward contracts are anti-competitive
They (weakly) increase prices
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Illustrative Example Conclusions
The impact of forward contracts
Equilibrium Prices
No contracts xi 2 (1, 2] > xj = 0
Symmetric rms f2, 2g f?, 2g
Firm i is large f3, 2g f?, 2g
Firm i is small f2, 3g f?, 3g
Contract volume and distribution are critical:
Contracts lead to lower prices if allocated to large rms
Contracts lead to higher prices if allocated to small rms
An increase in contract volume need not be pro-competitive
The symmetry assumption would hide these e¤ects
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Analysis of the Model Weakly-dominated strategies
Weakly-dominated strategies
We restrict attention to strategies that are not weakly-dominated.
Weak-dominance arguments eliminate...
1 below marginal cost bidding for qi > xi (net-seller).
2 above marginal cost bidding for qi < xi (net-buyer).
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Analysis of the Model Non-price-setters and Price-setter
Equilibrium bidding by the non-price-setters
Proposition
At any Nash equilibrium in which rm i is a price-setter, all other rms
produce the same output as if they bid at marginal costs.
Bertrand-like intuition
If one of rm js undispatched units has MC below p, rm j could
increase its output by bidding slightly below p.
If one of rm js dispatched units has MC above p, rm j could
avoid losses by bidding slightly above p.
Corollary
At any non-competitive Nash equilibrium, there is a unique price-setter.
De Frutos and Fabra (2009) Pro-competitive Forward Contracts May 2009 26 / 36
Analysis of the Model Non-price-setters and Price-setter
Equilibrium bidding by the non-price-setters
Proposition
At any Nash equilibrium in which rm i is a price-setter, all other rms
produce the same output as if they bid at marginal costs.
Bertrand-like intuition
If one of rm js undispatched units has MC below p, rm j could
increase its output by bidding slightly below p.
If one of rm js dispatched units has MC above p, rm j could
avoid losses by bidding slightly above p.
Corollary
At any non-competitive Nash equilibrium, there is a unique price-setter.
De Frutos and Fabra (2009) Pro-competitive Forward Contracts May 2009 26 / 36
Analysis of the Model Non-price-setters and Price-setter
Equilibrium bidding by the non-price-setters
Proposition
At any Nash equilibrium in which rm i is a price-setter, all other rms
produce the same output as if they bid at marginal costs.
Bertrand-like intuition
If one of rm js undispatched units has MC below p, rm j could
increase its output by bidding slightly below p.
If one of rm js dispatched units has MC above p, rm j could
avoid losses by bidding slightly above p.
Corollary
At any non-competitive Nash equilibrium, there is a unique price-setter.
De Frutos and Fabra (2009) Pro-competitive Forward Contracts May 2009 26 / 36
Analysis of the Model Non-price-setters and Price-setter
Equilibrium bidding by NPS and PS
NPS behave as price-takers (need not bid at MC)
qNPSj (p
) 2 argmax
qj
piNPSj
 
p; qj

,
The PS chooses p to maximize its prots:
pPSi (b i ) 2 argmaxp pi
PS
i (p
; b i )
where,
piPSi (p
; b i ) = p [qi (p
; b i )  xi ]  C (qi (p; b i )) + τixi .
Note: The prot function may fail to be di¤erentiable.
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Analysis of the Model Non-price-setters and Price-setter
Incentives to raise the price
Suppose the PS raises the price from p to p0 :
∆piPSi =

p0   p qi  p0; b i   xi   Z qi (p;b i )
qi (p 0;b i )
[p   ci (z)] dz .
Greater incentives to raise price....
the bigger its net-position (if net-seller),
the less elastic its residual demand,
the smaller the price-cost margin on its lost production.
Corollary
The PSprot max. price is non-decreasing in its contracts.
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Analysis of the Model Equilibrium characterization
Equilibrium characterization
Necessary and su¢ cient conditions for an equilibrium:
1 All rms must optimize conditionally on their identities:
PS sets the price that max. its prots.
NPS are price-takers.
2 Deviations that involve a change in identity must be unprotable:
PS!NPS: increase its production despite price reduction.
NPS!PS: increase p despite output loss.
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Analysis of the Model Equilibrium existence and multiplicity
Equilibrium existence and multiplicity
Existence
The highest price equil. with NPS bidding at MC always exists.
Multiplicity
There might coexist multiple equilibria with di¤erent price-setters.
But, for a given PS, all equilibria are outcome equivalent
regardless of whether NPS bid at MC or not.
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The Impact of Forward Contracts Asymmetric rms
The impact of forward contracts
Equilibrium prices w/o contracts

pPS1  pPS2  ...  pPSi
	
, i  N.
Contracts
If awarded to rm 1:
The equilibria in which this rm sets prices may cease to exist.
Remaining equilibrium prices are lower.
If awarded to rm i :
The equilibria in which this rm sets prices may cease to exist.
Remaining equilibrium prices are higher.
If awarded to rms n > i :
Contracts have no e¤ect.
Contracts have the potential to improve market performance
only if they mitigate existing asymmetries
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The Impact of Forward Contracts Asymmetric rms
Contracts to large rm (low asymmetry)
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price-setter
disappears
Figure 4: Contracts by large rm (capacity shares (55%,55%))
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The Impact of Forward Contracts Asymmetric rms
Contracts to large rm (high asymmetry)
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Figure 5: Contracts by large rm (capacity shares (60%,40%))
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The Impact of Forward Contracts Asymmetric rms
Contracts to small rm (low asymmetry)
34
39
44
49
54
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Contracts by Firm 2
Pr
ic
es
Equilibrium price (Firm 1 price-setter)
Equilibrium price (Firm 2 price-setter)
Competitive price
Equilibrium with firm 2
price-setter disappears
Figure 6: Contracts by small rm (capacity shares (55%,55%))
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Conclusions
Conclusions
1 We characterize equilibrium bidding in a multi-unit auction with
complete information, forward contracts, and asymmetric rms.
2 Are contracts pro-competitive or anti-competitive?
The scope of contracts to improve market performance depends on:
Market structure
Total contract volume and its distribution across rms
Anti-competitive if they make net-positions more asymmetric.
3 How should contracts be awarded?
In order to (virtually) reduce asymmetries across rms:
Impose forward contract obligations on large rms.
Allow medium-sized competitors to buy such contracts.
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Conclusions
Thank You.
Paper available at www.eco.uc3m.es/nfabra
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